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Abstract
When labor incomes approach subsistence levels, the labor supply curve
slopes outward, because the fight for survival mandates households to look
for longer work hours in response to falling wage rates. We explore conditions
under which near-subsistence scenarios may imply wage traps, labor market
failures that can be the cause of undernourishment, illiteracy, and child labor.
After stating general conditions under which wage traps occur, we look at
specific production functions typically employed in quantitative analyses of
growth and development. We find that standard Cobb-Douglas production
functions do not permit wage traps, whereas CES functions do. Beyond that
it turns out that when subsistence requirements increase with work hours, and
when work effort rises with the wage rate, up to the efficiency-wage thresh-
old, wage traps become more likely. Measures such as bans on child labor,
implementation of minimum wage laws, or the establishment of labor unions
may quite effectively improve conditions in wage-trapped labor markets.
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1 Introduction
There is a lengthy discussion on record in the history of economic thought con-
cerning the possibility and implications of a backward-bending labor-supply curve.1
The typical example of a negatively-sloped labor supply curve occurs at high wage
rates and incomes, and is of little interest from the perspective of poor countries
with insufficient development dynamics. The other end of the wage spectrum has
received much less attention. When wages are very low and labor incomes approach
subsistence levels, the need to keep heads above water simply in order to survive
renders the slope of the labor supply curve negative as well. In this situation the
fight for physical survival dominates all other considerations, such as the consump-
tion/leisure trade-offs embedded in standard utility functions, and forces households
to look for longer work hours in response to falling wage rates.
The first paper to address the issue of negatively sloped, or ‘outward-sloping’
labor supply curves in poor countries or industries from an economic perspective
appears to be Krueger (1962). This is underscored by the fact this short, 2-page
text does not cite any prior work in addition to Samuelson’s (1947) masterpiece.
Krueger is mainly interested in the effect of outward-sloping labor supply on capital
formation and rules out the existence of multiple equilibria by assumption. Picking
up the topic a decade later, Barzel and McDonald extent the argument by introduc-
ing wealth and demonstrate that lack of sufficient assets to provide for survival is
a sufficient condition for a negatively sloped labor supply curve at low wage rates.
When Dessing (2002)2 revived interest in the topic, she also focused on the the-
oretical underpinnings of the outward-sloping segment of the labor supply curve,
but, again, did not discuss the interplay with labor demand and the possibility of
multiple labor market equilibria. Prasch (2000) did add a labor demand curve to his
version of a ‘revised labor supply schedule’ and point to the possibility of multiple
equilibria. His discussion remained verbal and vague, however, and multiple equilib-
ria are assumed rather than derived, and their implications are not really explored.
1The traditional explanation of the backward-bending labor supply curve is based on the premise
that beyond a certain wage threshold, the income effect dominates the substitution effect. More re-
cent contributions look at other possible explanations. For example, Lin (2003) derives a backward-
bending segment of the labor supply curve without an income effect by treating work effort and
work hours as distinct variables in an efficiency wage model.
2Even though this paper was published as late as 2002, its main arguments already feature in
the author’s doctoral dissertation submitted more than a decade earlier. See Dessing (1990).
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The first full-fledged discussion of multiple labor market equilibria and their policy
implications was offered by Basu and Van (1999). There also, however, multiple
equilibria are conceded to be a possibility and then assumed to exist, without really
exploring the conditions under which this might be the case.3
Our paper attempts to fill this gap. Specifically, and most importantly, we move
beyond the straightforward formulation of generic conditions for multiple equilibria
by looking at specific production functions and subsistence constraints. The im-
portant insight derived from this endeavor is that low-wage traps which may come
with multiple labor market equilibria and may be at the root of problems such as
child labor, undernourishment or widening income distributions, can have a variety
of causes. This implies that one-size-fits-all policy recommendations may be mis-
leading and need to be replaced by a careful examination of the specifics of the wage
trap at hand. If such wage traps only exist in small, low-wage sectors of an otherwise
developed economy, chirurgic policy measures such as minimum wage laws may be
called for and suffice. If wage traps are characteristic of major parts of a low-income
economy, foreign aid of the big-push variety may be called for, as is often suggested
in the literature on poverty traps.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
introduction to labor markets with a Z-shaped labor supply curve and sets the
stage for the subsequent analysis. Section 3 formulates generic conditions for the
emergence of path-dependent labor market equilibria that may include wage traps.
In section 4 we become more specific by asking whether production functions that
feature most prominently in applied research permit wage traps. The obtained
results are subjected to robustness checks in section 5 where we permit subsistence
levels and the efficiency of labor to be endogenous. Section 6 offers a concise overview
of the empirical literature on labor supply schedules in poor countries, and discusses
its relevance for the theoretical discussions of this paper. Section 7 contains a brief
discussion of policy measures. Finally, section 8 sums up and offers an outlook on
3What is puzzling is that Basu and Van (1999) does not contain a reference to any of the
earlier papers mentions in this paragraph. This perplexes all the more as in an ensuing exchange
Swinnerton and Rogers (1999) and Basu and Van (1999) discuss to what extent redistributional
policies may serve to eliminate child labor, an issue already addressed by Barzel and McDonald
(1973) in indirect form.
4The most comprehensive survey on poverty traps is Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), which
draws on Azariadis (1996, 2004). A recent empirical study on the relevance of two specific kinds
of poverty traps, with negative results, is Kraay and Raddatz (2006).
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future research.
2 Outward-Sloping Labor Supply andWage Traps
The existence of a negatively sloped labor supply curve near subsistence levels is not
a serious problem per se. Consider Figure 1, where the bold line shows a complete
labor supply curve and helps put the issue at hand in perspective. It has been
coined the S-shaped labor supply curve or, more correctly, the inverted S-shaped
labor demand curve. Most fitting, perhaps, is the term ‘Z-shaped labor supply curve’
suggested by Grimsrud (2003). It includes the familiar backward-bending segment at
high wage rates, the normal positively-sloped middle part, and the negatively-sloped
segment near the bottom. To distinguish this segment from the backward-bending
segment on top, this section is often called the ‘outward sloping’ (or ‘forward falling’)
part of the labor supply curve.
[Figure 1 near here]
A simple but straightforward way to rationalize this Z-shape is by proposing that
households choose consumption C > 0 and their supply of labor L ∈ [0, L] so as to
maximize the utility function
U = U(C,L− L)× S,
subject to the budget constraint C = w · L, where U(·) > 0 and where
S =
1 if wL > MIN,0 if wL < MIN.
The backward bend for high wage levels would result from appropriate properties
of the utility function U(·). The outward-sloping segment for low wage levels in turn
obtains because utility drops to zero when income falls short of the subsistence level.
In order to avoid this, any drop in the wage rate mandates an appropriate increase
in work hours offered to firms.5
5The less than elegant kink in the labor supply curve results from our attempt to provide
a parsimonious and intuitive formal model of the Z-shaped labor supply curve that makes the
subsistence level threshold explicit. For a smoother transition from the positively-sloped to the
outward-sloping segment, one might let S be a continuous variable in the interval [0, 1] that mea-
sures health, and make it depend on labor income. We do not need to complicate things this way,
since this paper’s focus is on labor market equilibria effectively positioned on the subsistence level
supply curve and on the properties of such scenarios.
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On a related point, one might imagine the outward slope in the supply curve
commencing already at wage levels where sheer survival and health are not as im-
mediately at stake, but where households simply prefer to compensate income losses
with additional work hours. Sharif (1991), for instance, proposes an outward-sloping
labor supply curve based on a utility function with a varying elasticity of substi-
tution between consumption and leisure, or food and rest time, in his terminology.
Again, abstracting from this issue is innocuous to the extent that our ensuing analy-
sis will focus on the outward-sloping part of the supply curve and, more specifically,
on wage levels which are so low that labor supply is indeed governed entirely by
subsistence needs.
In the situation depicted in Figure 1, the subsistence-level equilibrium in A is
stable, and as technological progress and capital accumulation tilt the labor demand
curve upward, two things happen. First, the welfare of workers and their families
improves, because while consumption initially remains stuck at the level required for
subsistence, work time falls and leisure time increases. This has the added benefit of
providing workers with more time to invest in their human capital, which spurs labor
productivity growth and accelerates the shift of the labor demand curve. Second,
the equilibrium will eventually cross the kink in the labor supply curve and labor
income will begin to grow along the positively-sloped segment of the labor supply
curve, benefiting from productivity increases.
[Figure 2 near here]
The case shown in Figure 2 is more dramatic. Here the labor market features
multiple equilibria. The one in the middle, marked by point A, occurs at the wage
rate wT. Since A is located at the point of intersection between the labor demand
curve and the subsistence segment of the labor supply curve, labor income just
equals subsistence income. Because the supply curve is flatter than the demand
curve, this equilibrium is not stable. From wage rates higher than wT, the labor
market converges into a high-income equilibrium C, where labor income comfortably
clears subsistence requirements. Once the real wage rate drops below the crucial rate
wT, the excess supply of labor drives wages down even further and forces households
to expand employment. Initially this may happen through longer work hours for one
parent, then for both parents, and finally by drawing on the family’s children, in a
futile effort to generate the family income needed for sheer survival. At some point,
though, the family exhausts all its members’ available work time, and employment
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cannot increase any further, no matter how low the wage rate becomes. At this
point the labor supply curve becomes vertical.6 It is in this segment, at a point
such as B, where the labor demand and supply curves intersect for a new, stable
equilibrium towards which the wage-trapped economy is drawn.7
This wage-trap equilibrium has some rather nasty characteristics:
(i) Incomes are stuck below subsistence needs, which has consequences for the
health and emotional and physical growth of family members.
(ii) Welfare is reduced, of course, since both consumption falls and leisure time
evaporates as one slides down the labor demand curve from A to B.
(iii) There is child labor, mandated by families’ struggle for survival that dominates
all other considerations, causing children to receive but a minimal level of
schooling, if any at all.
The route of escape from this trap would have to be technological progress and
the accumulation of physical and human capital, since this would tilt the labor
demand curve upward which, in turn, would eventually eliminate the wage trap.
Improvement may eventually come when the labor demand curve has moved far
enough, but the forces that typically foster this process are either absent or alarm-
ingly weakened in this scenario:
(a) There is virtually no human capital accumulation, both because adults are
entirely absorbed by the struggle for survival, and because formal schooling
for children is more or less absent.
(b) There is a very high mortality rate among all generations, caused by incomes
being stuck below subsistence requirements, which also inhibits human capital
accumulation.
(c) The diffusion of technological innovations from the global economy to such
6It has even been suggested (Dessing, 2002, p. 441) that this section is again positively-sloped
rather than vertical, since families may be forced to withdraw from the formal labor market to
resort to non-market, illegal or outright criminal activities to raise income. These activities range
from begging and prostitution to stealing and more serious crime. We ignore this possibility, since
it is not of key importance for the issues addressed here.
7The vertical segment of the labor supply curve is not really covered by the simple utility
function proposed above, since utility is zero at any point below the subsistence curve. Thus,
households are indifferent between such points. To remedy this, one might propose a separable
utility function of the form U = U(C,L − L) × S + u(wL −MIN) × (1 − S) with u(0) = 0 and
u′ > 0 which makes sub-subsistence households want to approach the subsistence level.
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labor markets will be possible only in rare cases, as the situation is typically
characterized by very low skill levels and a high extent of equally unskilled
child labor.
(d) Factors mentioned under (a)–(c) are also detrimental to investment and the
growth of the capital stock.
(e) Though improvements in technology and human and physical capital stock
may be achieved in spite of the difficulties just mentioned, these will generate
only minor effects on the labor demand curve in the region where it counts
in the current context. This is because such improvements typically tilt the
labor demand curve upward (instead of shifting it), thus hardly affecting the
position of wage trap equilibrium A.
It is these unpleasant properties of the wage-trap scenario proposed here that
make us ask under what conditions such a trap may occur. With this question in
mind, the remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 states the general
conditions under which wage traps occur, cast in terms of the wage elasticities of
labor demand and supply. Section 4 then turns to specific production functions
of the kind employed in quantitative analyses of growth and development. It is
revealed that a standard Cobb-Douglas production function does not permit wage
traps, whereas a CES production function does.
In Section 5 the analysis is extended by relaxing some of the assumptions of
“pure” scenarios. In particular, we drop the assumption of a parametric subsistence
level and permit the level of income required for survival to vary with work hours.
We also allow work effort or efficiency to depend on the real wage, as assumed in
efficiency wage models, with rather surprising and complex results. Section 7 con-
tains a brief discussion of policy options. Section 8 sums up and suggests questions
to be addressed in future research.
3 When Do Wage Traps Occur?
As a backdrop for our analysis, this section formulates generic conditions for the
occurrence of wage traps. Letting LS(w) and LD(w) denote the labor supply and de-
mand functions, respectively, a market equilibrium w∗ obtains for LS(w∗) = LD(w∗),
that is, for a real wage which equates supply and demand.
Wage traps are encountered when market equilibria are unstable in the sense that
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excess demand is strictly increasing in the wage w. In this case, a wage rate below
the market-clearing level w∗ leads to an oversupply of labor, which in turn causes
wages to fall even further rather than adjusting upward toward the market-clearing
rate.8
Formally, wage traps in the definition employed here will therefore occur if
L′D(w
∗) > L′S(w
∗), (1)
so that, around the market-clearing wage rate w∗, a drop in the real wage expands
labor supply by more than labor demand.
It is convenient to reformulate this stability condition in terms of elasticities.
Letting εS(w) = L
′
S(w) · w/LS(w) and εD(w) = L′D(w) · w/LD(w) denote the elas-
ticities of labor supply and demand, respectively, condition (1) can be restated as
εD(w
∗) > εS(w∗). (2)
We now turn to the case where the labor market equilibrium is positioned at
a point at which labor incomes hover around levels that barely support physical
subsistence. In its simplest version, the subsistence-level hypothesis outlined in the
introduction asserts that, for any real wage w, workers will choose labor supply so
as to maintain a fixed subsistence-level of income MIN, the minimal income which
a worker must obtain to remain in good health. Inverse labor supply around the
subsistence level is then given by
LS(w) = MIN/w.
The key property of this subsistence level labor supply function is that εS = −1,
so that labor supply is perfectly elastic. That is, if the wage drops by 10%, work-
ers will work exactly 10% more in order to retain the subsistence level of income.
Consequently, a market equilibrium w∗ will be unstable whenever
εD(w
∗) > −1. (3)
Thus, for a wage trap to occur, labor demand must be inelastic. A 10% drop in the
wage rate must give rise to a hike in employment of less than 10%.
8This notion of stability, known as Walrasian stability, derives from the idea that the demand
side tends to raise its wage bids when excess demand is positive whereas the supply side will
lower its requested wage when excess demand is negative (see, e.g., Henderson and Quandt, 1986,
Chapter 6–8).
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4 Wage Traps with Cobb-Douglas or CES Pro-
duction Functions
Having formulated generic conditions concerning the existence of wage traps in the
previous section, we now review the scope for such traps under commonly used pro-
duction functions. Given any production function F (L) (and holding other factors
of production fixed), competitive labor demand is determined by LD(w) = F
′−1(w),
so that the elasticity of labor demand becomes
εD(L) =
F ′(L)
F ′′(L) · L .
Cobb-Douglas Production Functions. First, consider the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, which is perhaps the most commonly used production function
in the empirical literature on growth and development issues. For a Cobb-Douglas
production function of the form Y = F (L) = ALβ (A > 0, 0 < β < 1),9 we have
F ′′(L) = (β − 1)F ′(L)/L, and hence
εD = −(1− β)−1 < −1.
Thus, under a Cobb-Douglas production function, the demand for labor is always
strictly elastic, implying that wage traps as sketched in Figure 2, defined as market
failure, cannot occur (i.e., condition (3) will always be violated).
Sub-subsistence equilibria, such as the one which occurs at point B in Figure 2,
are nevertheless possible when the production function is of the conventional Cobb-
Douglas type. This occurs when technology is so poor and/or the stock of capital
is so low that the labor demand curve remains below the supply curve all through
the interval 0 6 L 6 Lall. A point of intersection still exists because the demand
curve is always flatter than the supply curve, and this equilibrium is indeed stable.
But since this equilibrium sits outside the available range, to the right of Lall, it can
never be reached, and the labor market finds itself stuck below the subsistence level
at B. Contrary to the situation depicted in Figure 2, however, this is not a market
failure: it is rather a situation in which no market exists. If such conditions were
permanent, the country or region would become deserted, or the industry would
disappear. Survival of the region or industry concerned, then, is only possible if
9This formulation covers the usual Cobb-Douglas form Y = A˜KαLβ since capital is held fixed
in our considerations.
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subsidies from outside keep it afloat for other motives.10 If such conditions are
created temporarily, say in the wake of a war or a major natural disaster, with
infrastructure and capital destroyed on a large scale, reconstruction support from
abroad would be needed and suffice in order to return the country to a unique, stable
equilibrium with labor incomes above the level of subsistence.
CES Production Functions. Next, consider the family of CES production func-
tions of the form F (L) = A(K˜ + βL−ρ)−1/ρ. For this class of production functions,
the elasticity of labor demand is
εD = −K˜ + βL
−ρ
(1 + ρ)K˜
. (4)
For ρ < 0, wage traps can generally be excluded. Labor demand is always elastic
since εD is bounded from above by −(1 + ρ)−1 < −1. For ρ > 0, however, εD
increases monotonously from −∞ to −(1 + ρ)−1 > −1, so that labor demand is
inelastic (and wage traps are possible) for sufficiently high levels of L (low levels
of MIN).11
Recalling that the parameter ρ is related to the (constant) elasticity of substitu-
tion σ by σ = (1 + ρ)−1, this implies that wage traps can only occur under a CES
production function if the elasticity of factor substitution is less than one.
[Figure 3 near here]
Figure 3 plots a specific example in which a wage trap occurs under a CES-
production function, namely for the following parameter values: ρ = 1.5 (implying
an elasticity of substitution of σ = 0.4), β = 0.5, K˜ = 2, A = 30, and MIN = 1.12,13
10Examples include countries that subsidize living in uninviting areas for environmental or strate-
gic purposes (for example high Alpine settlements or the Falklands), or industries with severe
comparative disadvantages, such as agriculture, to achieve a minimum level of autarky.
11Note for ρ → 0 (as the CES production function approaches a Cobb-Douglas production
function), ε−1D approaches −K˜/(K˜ + β) > −1 (and hence becomes independent of L) for ρ→ 0.
12Strictly speaking, there is also a stable equilibrium at L ≈ 0.21 that is not shown in the
plot. Through the reasoning given in the introduction, in this area of relatively high leisure,
consumption and high wages, we should expect labor supply to be governed by concerns other
than the subsistence-level issues considered here.
13For this parameterization, at L∗ (where supply meets demand), the share of labor income is
approximately 5%, while the (non-inverse) elasticity of labor demand is approximately 0.6.
10
5 Robustness Checks
Given the prominent role that Cobb-Douglas production functions play in empirical
research on income comparisons, growth and development, the above finding that
wage traps are not compatible with such functional forms is an important one. In
an effort to gauge the robustness of this result we now relax two key assumptions
employed in Section 3. We first ask what happens if subsistence requirements are
not parametric but depend on physical exertion and, thus, on work hours supplied.
Second, we ask what are the consequences of labor productivity or work effort being
dependent on the real wage rate? While both modifications may not appear urgent in
analyses of industrial countries, studies of labor markets in poor, agrarian economies
may be rendered unrealistic without them.
5.1 Variations on Labor Supply
Suppose the workers’ subsistence-level of income MIN depends positively on the
number of hours worked, so that MIN′(L) > 0. A plausible explanation for this may
simply be that as the number of hours worked increases, the individual’s calorie
intake required to sustain this additional effort rises. With this modification, the
inverse elasticity of labor supply is
εS =
(
−1 + MIN
′(L) · L
MIN(L)
)−1
< −1.
Thus, the supply of labor will be strictly elastic and, as a consequence, wage traps
may occur even with an elastic labor demand as implied by the Cobb-Douglas
production function. An example with a constant employment elasticity γ of the
subsistence threshold would be MIN(L) = λ ·Lλ (λ, γ, L > 0). Then ε−1S = −1+γ >
−1, and the labor market features a wage trap even though the production function
is Cobb-Douglas whenever γ > β. This functional form must be considered an
approximation in the neighborhood of the labor market equilibrium, however, since
it implies that the subsistence level drops to zero when households retreat from
employment altogether.14
14Adding a constant to the suggested equation to obtain MIN(L) = λ0+λ1 ·Lγ would make the
employment elasticity of the subsistence level increase with L. Then this elasticity and the wage
elasticity of labor supply would have to be evaluated at the point of intersection with the labor
demand curve.
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5.2 Variations on Labor Demand
Suppose work effort (or efficiency) depends on the real wage rate, an assumption
that is at the heart of efficiency wage models. Among many possible explanations
for such a relationship the one that focuses on calorie intake and its positive impact
on strength and endurance, as is the case in agrarian economies or sectors, appears
particularly relevant for the issues at hand. Let the production function be
F (L) = A(E × L)β
with work effort
E = wα.
With this modification, the demand for labor is given by
L =
(
βAwαβ−1
) 1
1−β
and the real-wage elasticity of labor demand is
εD = −1− αβ
1− β ,
which coincides with what we derived for the orthodox Cobb-Douglas production
function in Section 4 when α = 0. This elasticity decreases (i.e., the demand for
labor schedule in a wage-employment diagram becomes steeper) when α increases.
However, a wage-dependent work effort, i.e., a positive value for α, is not generally
enough to generate a wage trap. Only when the elasticity of labor demand falls
below −1, the inverse wage elasticity of labor supply at the subsistence limit, do
wage traps spring up. The condition for this to happen is obviously α > 1. As
the real wage elasticity of work effort increases still further, the labor demand curve
continues to turn steeper, and eventually becomes vertical when α = 1/β. At this
point, the wage elasticity of income equals 1. Then any change in the real wage
generates an identical change in the marginal product of labor. Thus, firms always
demand the same amount of labor, no matter what the real wage rate is.
Now as α increases even beyond this threshold, the occurrence of a wage trap
does not become more likely, as one might presume. This is because we are now
entering efficiency-wage territory. By now the “labor demand curve” has turned
positive and firms expect to increase profits by raising the wage rate, due to the fact
that when the wage rate goes up the marginal productivity of labor goes up even
12
faster. So there is no downward spiral of the wage rate below the equilibrium point,
even though the supply of labor exceeds the demand for labor at any given wage
rate. Despite this excess supply, firms pay an efficiency wage that exceeds the wage
demands of workers.
[Figure 4 near here]
Figure 4 may help to motivate these results. The dashed line is the labor demand
curve that derives from the conventional Cobb-Douglas production function. This
curve obtains when α = 0 and it is flatter than the subsistence-level labor demand
curve. Thus the labor market equilibrium is stable. As α increases, the labor
demand curve turns steeper than the labor supply curve and the labor market is
unstable, and wage trapped. When α crosses the second threshold α = 1/β, the
labor demand curve turns out of the shaded region, and its slope becomes positive.
Now profits increase as we slide up the labor demand curve, and firms voluntarily
pay wages that exceed the subsistence level.
So the result of this section is quite complex: wage-dependent work effort may
indeed be the cause of wage traps even though the production function is the Cobb-
Douglas and the subsistence level is parametric. But for a wage trap to occur and
be operational, the wage elasticity of work effort must be in the zone 1 < α < 1/β.
Outside this zone the equilibrium either remains stable, or firms pay efficiency wages
despite an apparent excess supply of labor.
In judging the empirical relevance of this condition, we note that it is less de-
manding than the condition required by efficiency-wage models, which is α > 1/β.
For a wage trap to occur, we need a weaker response of work effort to changes in
the real wage rate than efficiency-wage models do.
As a further refinement, again with an eye on conditions characteristic of em-
ployment in agriculture, let work effort not only rise with the real wage, but also
decline with work hours as workers tire. Then
E =
wα
Lδ
,
and the wage elasticity of labor demand changes to
εD = − 1− αβ
1 − (1− δ)β .
This leaves the upper limit for α to generate wage traps unaffected, but lowers the
lower limit. Wage traps now occur when the real-wage elasticity of work effort is in
the wider range of 1− δ < α < 1/β.
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6 A survey of pertinent empirical work
Before we proceed to look at the policy options available to governments and inter-
national organizations confronted with wage trap scenarios of one kind or other, we
pause to look at what pertinent empirical studies say about the relevance of what
we are discussing here.
The key question is whether an outward-sloping segment of the labor supply
curve is merely a theoretical construct or a phenomenon that is actually encountered
in reality. In a nutshell, available results suggest that, while it may be stretching
things to conclude that ’the forward-falling labor supply is at the least becoming a
new stylized fact.’ [Nakamura and Murayama (2009)], a substantial body of empiri-
cal evidence exists of negative wage (or income) elasticities of labor supply available
at early stages of economic development.
The empirical literature up until the mid-1990s has been surveyed by Sharif
(2000). From the available empirical work on the labour supply of poor workers
at low standards of living both in developing and in industrialized countries, he
concludes: ’Almost all the empirical studies observe that their labour supply at
very low wage rates is a negatively sloping (forward-falling) function. However,
studies that distinguish very low from moderately low wages report two types of
supply function - a negatively sloped one at very low wages and a positively sloped
one at moderately low wages’ (p. 431).
Later and recent work finds further evidence of ’anomalous’ labor supply be-
haviour. Studies that look at the labour supply of families include Sharif (1991) and
Pradhan and van Soest (1997). Looking at Indian data, Sharif finds that while the
wage elasticity of male work hours changes from positive to negative as we move
towards lower wages, these elasticities are always negative for women and even more
negative for children. Pradhan and van Soest (1997) conclude from their analysis of
Bolivian data that females work more when their husbands earn less.
Another body of work looks at those family members expected to have the most
flexible supply of work hours. Looking at India, Dasgupta and Goldar (2005) identify
a significantly outward-sloping labour supply for women when their households are
below some poverty threshold. More indirect evidence in line with the hypothesis of
an outward-sloping supply curve is provided by Mammen and Paxson (2000). After
studying data for 90 countries, they find that female participation rates are U-shaped
during a countries development. As long as the country is poor, participation rates
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recede when per-capita incomes grow. Beyond a certain threshold, participation
rates rise again when per-capita incomes continue to grow.
Other studies look at child labour and work hours of older household members.
Jensen and Nielsen (1997) for Zambia and Blunch and Verner (1999) for Ghana
report a direct relationship between poverty and child labour, while Edmonds (2006)
finds that children in South African households with one member that collects some
sort of pension have a higher probability of attending school. Finally, Sawant (2009)
reports a negative correlation between the wage rate and the labour supply of older
people in Indonesia.15
The lesson to be drawn from available empirical evidence is that outward-sloping
segments are features of the labour supply curve that are indeed encountered in the
real world. Not always, but quite frequently. And not only in developing economies,
but on occasion in certain industries or income brackets of industrialized countries
also. Such negative wage elasticities are a necessary conditions but not sufficient
ones for wage traps, of course. Elasticity estimates encountered in econometric work,
however, provide a first clue as to which of the wage trap scenarios, or sufficient
conditions, discussed in section 2 may be the most relevant in reality. The fact that
elasticities, even when negative, do not drop below −1, rules out case the scenario
discussed in section 5.1 (the combination of simple Cobb-Douglas and a subsistence
level the rises with employment) and leaves the cases discussed in sections 4 and 5.2
as the scenarios to look for in future empirical work.16
We next look at policy options available when a country or industry is stuck in
a wage trap.
7 Policy Measures
Section 2 provided a glimpse at the rather unpleasant properties of wage-trap equi-
libria in the labor market, and the negative effect this has on development prospects.
The natural question to ask now is what can be done once such a trap is diagnosed.
15It appears well worth noting that evidence of outward-sloping labor supply curves at low
levels of income is not only found in developing countries, but, though less often, in industrialized
countries as well. See Dessing (2008) and the example reported by Camerer et al. (1997) that
New York City cab drivers “set a loose daily income target and quit working once they reach that
target.” Wage elasticities average approximately −1.
16For one specific example, Dessing (2002) reports wage elasticities of household labour supply
in the Philippines derived from OLS estimates of −0.554.
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This section looks at a few structural measures from the toolbox of labor market
and development policies. It indicates that if the culprit behind a poverty trap is
a wage-trapped labor market, measures traditionally suggested in the literature on
poverty traps in models of economic growth should not be overlooked, but should be
supplemented by labor market instruments for quicker results or temporary relief.
Regarding these labor market instruments, we also see that in the presence of wage
traps, conventional wisdom on labor market policy is often turned on its head.
Foreign aid. Standard measures of development aid in terms of grants or long-
term loans at favorable interest rates, earmarked for investment in infrastructure,
technology, education or private investment subsidies, would mainly target the labor
demand curve. Effects from such measures may take a long time to materialize.
Also, help needs to be substantial in order to push the economy out of the wage-
trap region, similar to big-push proposals advanced in the context of conventional
poverty traps such as those that derive from inadequate savings rates at low income
levels. And, as already mentioned in Section 2, effects may be rather small in the very
region where the low labor-income equilibrium is positioned, since the productivity
of child labor may not respond very strongly to capital accumulation and the influx
of established technology from the global economy. Other help, in kind or in money,
that covers at least part of the subsistence gap in labor income, may improve the
situation for families and their children during the time needed to move out of the
wage trap, and in fact, may speed things up by making aid conditional on children
returning to schools.
A ban on child labor.
[Figure 5 near here]
Consider Figure 5. Suppose that all available family labor, including child labor,
is exhausted at Lall. Then the sub-subsistence equilibrium is at point B and the
family’s labor income falls short of subsistence needs by an amount measured by the
shaded area D. Now let available adult labor be Ladult. Then the effect of an outright
ban on child labor, say through domestic legislation, is to move the sub-subsistence
equilibrium to point B′. In addition to the primarily targeted elimination of child
labor and improved schooling, this has the added benefit of moving family incomes
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closer to subsistence requirements. The subsistence deficit in labor incomes has
shrunk from the shaded area D to area D′.17
Minimum wages. Simply instituting the minimum wage rate w′ can generate
the same aggregate outcome that results from a ban on child labor. Underneath
aggregate numbers, however, it is uncertain that it is exclusively or even predomi-
nantly children who drop out of employment when labor demand falls. On the other
hand, minimum wages could even lift the labor market out of the wage trap entirely
and restrict it to a range where market forces work properly. Setting the minimum
wage rate only slightly above the threshold wT would make firms bid up wage rates
until they reach wHI. At this wage rate, child labor would become extinct,
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would be no unemployment and, perhaps most importantly, labor income would sit
comfortably above the level of subsistence.
Trade unions. Labor unions with sufficient monopoly power can set wage rates
at any desired level, while leaving it up to firms to decide how much labor they want
to employ at that price. Typically, such a trade union would demand a wage rate
above wHI, just as any monopolist would set prices higher than the level obtained
under perfect competition. This would prevent the labor market from falling into the
wage trap: it effectively removes incentives for child labor and raises labor income
far above the subsistence level. The downside of this institutional change would
probably be a certain amount of involuntary unemployment.
Fair trade agreements. When properly set up, monitored and enforced, fair
trade agreements can achieve the same results as national legislation banning child
labor, or setting minimum wages, and can also help establish trade unions or give
them more leverage.
17A sufficient condition for D′ < D is that, for any L > Ladult, the labor demand curve is steeper
than the supply curve. This is always met with the constant-elasticity specifications used in most
parts of this paper. Necessary conditions are much weaker, of course. Nevertheless, functional
forms that do not support this result may exist.
18Here, we assume that parents make their children drop out of school and work only when
pressured by sub-subsistence incomes.
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8 Summary and Outlook
When work incomes hover around subsistence levels, further cuts in wage rates
may force families to increase their supply of labor. If, in addition, the elasticity
of this labor supply with respect to the real wage rate exceeds the wage elasticity
of labor demand, equilibria on this outward-sloping segment of the labor supply
curve are unstable and labor incomes may end up trapped at or below subsistence
levels. Additional unpleasant properties of such degenerated equilibria include adult
illiteracy, child labor and a far-ranging detachment from global development trends.
Fortunately, when turning to specific functional forms with proven empirical
credentials, generic conditions for wage traps are not met when the production
function is Cobb-Douglas and income levels required for survival are exogenous.
However, the more general CES production function does permit wage traps under
quite plausible parameter scenarios.
Beyond our reference setting, features that render wage traps more likely are
endogenous subsistence levels that increase with work time, and work effort (or labor
productivity) that is positively related to wage rates, as proposed in efficiency wage
theory. Both of these features are often encountered in poor countries with dominant
agricultural sectors, where the physical aspects of work prevail. Interestingly though,
the influence of the wage elasticity of work effort on the occurrence of wage traps
is not monotonic. The effect is positive only up to a certain threshold. Once we
go beyond this point to enter efficiency-wage territory, the wage trap disappears
because profit-maximizing firms pay higher wage rates voluntarily.
Wage-trapped economies may benefit from policy measures that tend to be
snubbed by from conventional labor market analysis. A ban on child labor has the
added benefit of reducing the subsistence gap in family incomes. Minimum wage
laws have the same effect when implemented modestly, and can even raise the labor
market out of the wage trap entirely when the minimum is set high enough. The
definitive remedy for wage traps are trade unions with a sufficient degree of market
power. But this comes at a price, since it has the side effect of some involuntary
unemployment. Consumers in the rich part of the world can play an important role
in this process by favoring products certified by fair trade agreements which enforce
standards that include all or some of the above policies.
This paper has taken a more or less isolated look at the labor market and has
omitted empirical issues altogether. Future work will have to remedy this. This can
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be done first by putting wage traps in macroeconomic context in order to properly
address issues of growth and development with a special focus on poverty traps, and
then by looking at available policy choices and their national and global repercus-
sions.19 Secondly, this can be accomplished by exploring the empirical relevance of
wage trap scenarios. Quite a number of empirical findings and statistics exist that
are well in line with the properties of a wage-trapped labor market, and point to the
relevance and potential benefits of studying such scenarios. Examples are the many
studies that detect a substantial increase in employment when already low wage
rates drop further;20 or estimates that about one billion people worldwide and al-
most half the population in regions such as the Indian subcontinent or sub-Saharan
Africa must live on less than 1 Dollar a day (World Bank, 2007, p. 65). As a com-
pelling sign that such incomes fall way short of subsistence requirements, a similar
percentage of children are underweight in many of these countries (World Bank,
2007, p. 67). In addition, child labor abounds and a high percentage of children
do not receive a formal primary education.21 While these are but isolated pieces of
evidence, they feed into a more complete assessment that needs to be developed.
19This would fit into a research agenda initiated by Age´nor (2005), who advocates a shift away
from an “excessive focus on micro and measurement issues” towards a “macroeconomics of poverty
reduction” (p. 349).
20Representative examples of older and more recent empirical studies that detect positive em-
ployment responses to falling wage rates in low income sectors or countries include Miracle (1976)
for African regions, Rosenzweig (1980) for India, Herna´ndez-Licona (2000) for Mexico, and Dessing
(2002) for the Philippines.
21In sub-Saharan Africa, an estimated 69 million or 35 percent of all children aged 5–14 work,
and 41 million of these children are out of school (Unicef, 2007, pp. 12 and 44).
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Figure 1: A Stable Labor Market Equilibrium with Outward-Sloping Supply.
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Figure 2: Multiple Equilibria and a Wage-Trapped Labor Market with Outward-
Sloping Supply.
Figure 2
Labor demand
Labor supply
L
w
0 1 2 3 4
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Figure 3: A Wage-Trapped Labor Market with a CES-Production Function.
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Figure 4: The Wage Elasticity of Work Effort and the Slope of the Labor Demand
Curve.
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Figure 5: Policy Measures in a Wage-Trapped Labor Market: A Ban on Child
Labor.
Figure 5
Research Highlights
- This paper explores conditions under which near-subsistence labor incomes imply wage 
traps.
- Wage traps are labor market failures that can cause undernourishment, illiteracy, and 
child labor.
- Orthodox Cobb-Douglas production functions do not permit wage traps.
- Cobb-Douglas functions featuring work effort that rises with the wage rate do permit 
wage traps, and so do CES functions.
- Bans on child labor, minimum wage laws, or labor unions may quite improve conditions 
in wage trapped labor markets.
